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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT. BY JESSE H. CHOPER.*
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS. 1980. Pp. 494. $25.50
Reviewed by Richard B. Saphire
We have come to an important crossroad in constitutional law.
Academic commentators are calling for a broad reexamination of
traditional assumptions about the role that both the Constitution and
Supreme Court can and should play in our society.I Some critics of the
Court complain that it takes too narrow a view of the Constitution,
while others have argued that the court interprets it too broadly. 2
Despite differences in perspective, most will no doubt agree with Professor Leff's observation that "it is awfully hard to be a credible constitution thinker by treating the Constitution as irrelevant." 3 Perhaps
it is time to look for new arguments to establish the relevance of constitutional law and the Court in American society in traditional terms
or to establish new criteria by which relevance is to be determined.
Professor of Law, University of California School of Law, Berkeley.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Ohio
State University, 1967; J.D., Chase College of Law, 1971; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1975.
1. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981) (calling for a new approach to the problems of the Constitution which includes a "conception of what our policy could and should be .... );
Parker, Political Vision in ConstitutionalArgument, Part One: A Call for a New
"Jurisprudence" of ConstitutionalLaw (February, 1979 draft) (unpublished) (advocating an approach to constitutional law which focuses on the "mission and method
of constitutional argument."); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretationof Public Law Scholarshipin the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1979)
(calling for the acceleration of post-nihilist scholarship); Tushnet, Darkness on the
Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89
YALE L.J. 1037, 1057-62 (1980) (contending that constitutional theory as currently
practiced is incoherent and urging an examination of "why internally contradictory institutions like judicial review are created, and how their contradictions emerge in legal
doctrine and history"). See also Leff, Unspeakeable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1229 [hereinafter cited as Leff]; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories; 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
I have offered some of my own views on this issue in Saphire, The Searchfor Objectivity in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 1
(1979-80).
3. Leff, supra note 1, at 1248.
*
**
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The sense that constitutional law is entering a new phase is not
necessarily confined to the scholarly community. Anyone familiar with
recent developments in the Supreme Court is likely to conclude that
the Court is uncertain of precisely what it and the Constitution stand
for.4 Moreover, the recent Presidential election has made us aware of

the imminent change in the composition of the Court and the likely
disruption of whatever agreement that may exist among the Justices
with respect to doing constitutional law.
Professor Choper's recent book has made a substantial contribution to the prevailing notion that constitutional theory must enter a
new phrase. His book, along with John Hart Ely's Democracy and
Distrust,5 represents the culmination of a generation of scholarship
whose major goal has been to establish for judicial review what Alexander Bickel termed "a justification on principle, quite aside from
supports in history and the continuity of practice." ' 6 With few exceptions, this task has proven extraordinarily difficult. 7 Despite
voluminous literature on the subject-not to mention the considerable
space devoted to the debate in Supreme Court opinions-the search
for justification goes on. Professor Choper's work is a most
sophisticated and capable contribution to this search. He offers some
fresh insights into old problems, and he does yeoman's work exploring
the validity of some major issues whose solutions have too frequently
been assumed to be self-evident to others. Moreover, he offers a
theory which, if adopted by the Court, would in his view adequately
settle much of the ongoing debate.
In the following pages, I shall sketch the major features of Professor Choper's effort, as described in the book's subtitle, to provide
"a functional reconsideration of the role of the Supreme Court." I will
then offer some views on some major strengths and weaknesses of his
work as well as some thoughts on its lasting significance.
4. See, e.g., Howard, The Burger Court: A Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma
Variations, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (summer 1980).
5. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. ELY].
6. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
A. BICKEL].

7. Perhaps the major exception has been Raoul Berger, who, at least in regard to
the fourteenth amendment, has found all his answers in the framers' intent. See R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY

JUDICIARY

(1977) [hereinafter cited as R. BERGER]. The in-

tense and extensive scholarly criticism which Berger's work has attracted might be
taken to indicate that his answers are either unpersuasive or too simplistic. Still, one
must recognize that a single attempt at justification or explanation will never be sufficient, either because the effort is, simply too overwhelming or because agreement on
any one theory would put the rest of us out of business.
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I.

After noting that the Constitution's major provisions address three
categories of concern-federalism, separation of powers and individual
rights-Professor Choper defines his purpose as an attempt "to examine these three broad categories of constitutional provisions and to
advance a principled, functional and desirable role for judicial review
in our democratic political system." 8 Recognizing that judicial review
in constitutional cases has been regarded as antimajoritarian and
therefore suspect, he seeks to mitigate suspicion by reexamining the
premises and offering a prescription for judicial involvement and noninvolvement in policymaking. His prescription seeks to lay a foundation strong enough to permit the Court to carry on the work for which
it is most needed and for which it is best suited-namely, the protection of individual rights (the Individual Rights Proposal). 9 Concommitantly, he argues that the Court should regard as nonjusticiable
those controversies which deal with "the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis the states" (the Federalism Proposal)'" as
well as those controversies which concern "the respective powers of
Congress and the President vis-a-vis one another" (the Separation Proposal). 1" Choper recognizes that both federalism and separation of
power issues can affect individual rights. He contends, however, that
interbranch disputes often seek to identify which governmental institution is empowered to act. He argues that this issue can and should be
resolved without the Court's intervention. Where individuals challenge
the power of any institution to act, the Individual Rights Proposal will
provide the requisite judicial protection.' 2
The Federalism and Separation Proposals are based on a notion of
8.

J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2

(1980) [hereinafter cited as J. CHOPER or referred to by page number].
9. The Individual Rights Proposal is discussed in Chapter 2. Although Choper
does not contend that "the political branches are either inherently incapable of
heeding personal liberties or that they always ignore their vitality in practice" (p. 68),
he believes that "a pragmatic appraisal-historic or contemporary-of our antimajoritarian Constitution, of the undemocratic structure of the Court, of the dynamics of
the American political process, and of the great scheme of our society ineluctably leads
to the conclusion that the overriding virtue of and justification for vesting the Court
with this awesome power is to guard against governmental infringement of individual
liberties secured by the Constitution." P. 64.
10. This proposal, articulated and defended in Chapter 4, is largely a restatement
of views he had expressed earlier. See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis
the States: The Dispensability of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
11. The Separation Proposal is articulated and defended in Chapter 5.
12. Choper discusses federalism claims at pp. 197-98; He discusses separation of
power claims at pp. 271-72.
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institutional equality. Where institutions possess sufficient power to
protect themselves against encroachments by others judicial mediation
is unnecessary; judicial review is only needed where political parity is
absent. For example, in interbranch disputes between Congress and the
President (e.g., foreign affairs, legislative veto, presidential impoundment), Choper argues that both institutions possess sufficient power,
incentive, and means to protect their perceived interests. For example,
Congress can withhold funds, refuse to enact legislation proposed by
the President, refuse to confirm presidential appointments, and, as a
last resort, invoke the process of impeachment. 3I In turn, the President
should be presumed to have the means available to protect what he
regards as his constitutional prerogatives from congressional enroachment. For example, where the President believes that a legislative veto
unduly intrudes into his responsibility to execute the laws, he can simply ignore the veto and take his chances that Congress will not be successful in exercising one of its protective devices.'" Thus the Supreme
Court should refuse to review such cases as the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, " in13. Congress' protective devices are discussed at pp. 281-98. Choper also argues
that the advantages that many have been conceded to the President in interbranch
disputes with Congress-advantages largely premised in the comparative speed and
responsiveness of the executive branch-are based upon the "myth" of a "monolithic
executive." p. 280. In truth, says Choper, the President is as much a prisoner of the
executive bureaucracy as its master. pp. 276-80. Although this observation is surely
valid, its significance may be too easily overstated. At least in the foreign affairs area,
political realities and feelings of patriotism often act to preclude the assertion of a
meaningful congressional role. See Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct
of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1976).
Moreover, although the War Powers Resolution, PUB. L. NO. 93-418, 87 Stat. 555,
has provided at least a theoretical foundation for greater parity between Congress and
the President in foreign affairs, its constitutional status (which, under Choper's
Separation Proposal would be non-justiciable) and its practical potential to control
presidential action are unclear. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 410-24 (10th ed. 1980).
A basic anomaly is present in Choper's argument. If Congress believed that it did
not need judicial review to protect its prerogatives against Executive encroachment, it
could easily express this view through legislation to restrict federal jurisdiction in
separation of powers cases. Similarly, it could restrict federal jurisdiction in states'
rights cases if there was broad agreement that states could always protect their interests
in the congressional processes. Choper's discussion of the Judicial Proposal suggests
that he would regard such legislation as properly subject to judicial review Pp. 380-86.
However, assuming that no individual rights were implicated in such a case, Choper's
Court might well be compelled to conclude that such legislation was constitutional,
especially in light of a conclusion that such legislation would not lie in an area where
the "coordinate branches are relatively undependable in securing adherence to constitutional precepts." P. 385.
14. The legislative veto problem is discussed on pp. 357-60.
15. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/13
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validating the one-house legislative veto, notwithstanding the fact that
' 6
such issues are "subtle, intriguing and hotly debated.'
Aside from cases which present bona fide individual rights concerns, Choper would recognize two major areas as appropriate for
Supreme Court intervention. First, the Court should remain free to
protect federal interests and policies against state encroachment.
Whereas the Federalism Proposal is justified by the states' representation and influence in Congress, the federal government cannot be
presumed to have sufficient interest in the states' political processes to
protect federal interests. This lack of adequate representation, which
also is true generally for "individuals and politically isolated
minorities" and which justifies the Individual Rights Proposal,
"justifies the Court's oversight of state action that allegedly invades or
nullifies federal prerogatives."" Second, the Court should continue to
"pass the final constitutional judgment on questions concerning the
permissible reach and circumscription of the 'judicial power"' (the
Judicial Proposal). Where Congress seeks to expand or constrict
federal judicial authority in ways which "seemingly conflict with Article III ' ' "8 the functional rationale does not apply. This is so because,
according to Choper, "the federal judicial branch is not formally
politically represented in the national legislative halls", ' and thus cannot be expected to protect its own interests. Moreover, Choper argues
that the Justices are especially suited, by temperament and training, to
determine the proper scope of judicial power.2"
II.
A.
The major proposals of Choper's theory are based upon several
common propositions. First, he argues that any exercise of the Court's
power, with the possible exception of its quasi-legislative position in
dormant commerce clause cases, is politically suspect. Along with
other mainstream theorists, he agrees that "the procedure of judicial
16.
17.

P. 360.
P. 69. Choper contends that the Court's review in the so-called dormant com-

merce clause cases is really not judicial review at all. Given Congress' power to reverse

the Court's decision by approving the state action through normal legislation, the
Court should be seen as performing "an essentially legislative role .... " p. 207.

18.

P. 384.

19.

Id.

20. "Such a task calls for special knowledge of judicial history, tradition, capacity, and mission rather than for practical judgments concerning the optimum distribution of governing authority ... to fulfill the complex social and economic needs of
American society." P. 384-85.
Published by eCommons, 1981
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review is in conflict with the fundamental principle of democracymajority rule under conditions of political freedom." 2 ' Even though
he engages in an elaborate attempt to show that "the national
legislative process conducted by the political branches is not impeccable democracy in action," he concludes that the Court is even less
democratic and "must be found to be the loser in terms of political
responsibility." 2 From this, Choper reasons that the Court must be
more selective and efficient in choosing the occasions for its intervention in the realm of policymaking. Its choice should be guided by functional considerations: Where is judicial review most needed? Where is
it most likely to be effective or ineffective? For what are the
Justices-either by virtue of their temperament, skill, and training or
the political insulation and protection enjoyed by virtue of Article
III-best suited and what are they most likely to do well? Perhaps
most importantly, Choper notes that the antidemocratic nature of
judicial review makes the Court the most vulnerable and frail of our
governmental institutions. The realpolitik of this position must be the
Court's guiding light. Given its limited political capital, the Court cannot be all things to all people. Choper, like a modern-day Alexander
Hamilton,2 reminds us that "the Court, having no electoral base of its
own and equipped with neither physical nor monetary instruments of
coercion, is almost totally dependent on the cooperation of politically
responsible public officials to perform its function successfully, and on
the confidence, goodwill, and respect of the people as a whole for the
ultimate source of its strength." 2' Since every decision invalidating a
legislative, executive or administrative act is likely to be met with some
official and popular resistence and hostility, and since the Court must
muster all the prestige and respect it can for the protection of individual and minority rights (the task to which it is most functionally
suited and which is likely to be the most controversial), it simply cannot afford to become involved in interbranch and federalism disputes
which, in any event, can be resolved reasonably well without it.
The Federalism and Separation Proposals are animated by a desire
to diminish the controversy and hostility which judicial review in
general, and review in individual rights cases in particular, would
otherwise attract. Such hostility is, according to Choper, a natural byproduct of the antidemocratic nature of judicial intervention in majoritarian political processes. Choper believes that the Court's
21.

P. 10.

22. P. 48.
23.

THE

FEDERALIST,

No. 78 (A. Hamilton).

24. P. 138.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/13
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withdrawal from states' rights and separation of powers issues will
preserve its political capital and generally diminish the prevailing sense
that the exercise of its power is politically suspect. I believe that the
Federalism and Separation Proposals would, if adopted by the Court,
tend to have a quite different effect than Choper suggests. They would
tend to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the perceived illegitimacy of
judicial review. Consequently, these proposals may diminish the
Court's ability to protect individual rights.
According to Choper (and virtually everyone else who has written
on the subject) the Court's power is most legitimate when it acts in service of the values and structures memorialized in the Constitution.
Although all judicial invalidations of policies adopted by the political
branches can be described as political acts, those which can be connected reasonably to the language, history, or structure of the Constitution generally have been regarded as consistent with the core no5
tion of judicial review first articulated in Marbury v. Madison. Such
judgments are distinguishable from the more pragmatic and partisan6
judgments appropriate to the legislative and executive functions.1
Where Congress or the President acts, the antidemocratic issue does
not arise because their actions are subject to popular restraints imposed by the normal electoral processes. When the Court acts, however,
its judgments are not susceptible to the same popular restraints
because of the tenure and salary protections conferred by Article III.
Since the Constitution tempers its preference for majoritarianism
through side constraints imposed by the Bill of Rights and the postCivil War amendments, the Court's interpretation of those provisions
and its enforcement of them as limitations on legislative and executive
actions has been regarded as fully consistent with democratic principles. When the Court acts on the basis of values which are neither
clearly expressed in, nor reasonably inferrable from, these textual provisions its power has been regarded as suspect because it can no longer
claim to be furthering, in at least a generalized sense, the values which
the Constitution marks as special. On such occasions, the justification
for the exercise of judicial power is thought to be weakest. Thus
regardless of how worthy or noble the cause, the Court is not free to
exercise or refrain from exercising its power unless authorized by the
Constitution.
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. The literature evidencing broad consensus on this point is voluminous. For
some particularly prominent examples, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A

Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
Published by eCommons, 1981
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Choper, of course, recognizes all of this. In responding to these
concerns, he relies upon highly pragmatic arguments. Elaborating on
his Individual Rights Proposal, he notes that "the constitutional text
provides neither explicit nor firm support for the Court's assumption"
of the power of judicial review. He further notes that the historical
materials provide "virtually no assistance" in resolving the issue. He
remarks that "enough has been said about original intent," he goes on
to observe that "[tihat is no longer the real issue.''2 7 Although debate
over its textual and historical validity continues, judicial review has
long been an established part of our legal and political landscape. Furthermore, in arguing for the special, and quintessentially legitimate
role of judicial review in individual rights cases, Choper relies upon a
"pragamatic appraisal-historic or contemporary-of our antimajoritarian Constitution .... "28 Similarly, in defense of his Federalism
Proposal, he argues, after noting the intractable problems of searching
for the framers' intent, that "the historical evidence on the particular
issue of original intent is sufficiently ambiguous to allow us to proceed
without attempting the onerous task of plowing this field,' '29 and that
"the only clear answer to these questions is that there is no clear
answer." 30 Thus instead of basing his argument on the text or the
framers' intent, Choper proceeds from a pragmatic assessment of the
states' power to further their interests in the national political process-a view which he contends is empirically demonstrable. 3 '
Choper's defense of the Separation Proposal runs along similar
lines. Beginning with references to the contributions of Locke and
Montesquieu to separation-of-powers theory, he concludes that neither
man envisioned any judicial role in establishing an effective scheme of
checks and balances. 3 2 He argues that the framers "trusted the
27.

P. 63.

28. P. 64.
29. P. 242. Given the longstanding practice of Supreme Court resolution of
federalism issues, as well as the considerable evidence that many of those who originally conceded the need for federal courts and the power of judicial review did so primarily because the federal courts might protect state sovereign prerogatives against federal
encroachment, see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
2-19 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler], one might expect a
less cursory attempt to marshal historical materials in support of a contrary position.
SYSTEM

30. P. 243.
31. A further example of this pragmatism is provided by Choper's ultimate argument for the Judicial Proposal: "Finally, the Judicial Proposal is premised on the
pragmatic thesis that the Court should speak the last constitutional word only when
realpolitik strongly indicates that earlier utterances by its coordinate branches are
relatively undependable in securing adherence to constitutional precepts." P. 385.
32. Pp. 264-65.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/13
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political interplay between the (executive and legislative) branches""
and concludes that "examination of the framers' attitudes does not
support the view that the Court must police constitutional conflicts
between the executive and legislative departments." 3' His effort to
marshal historical materials here is more ambitious than in the case of
the Federalism Proposal. Nevertheless, Choper fails to provide convincing historical support. One who measures the credibility of a theory in
terms of its historical pedigree will likely be somewhat disappointed.
It must be remembered that Choper recognizes that a major factor
for "those who are inclined to respond belligerently to declarations of
unconstitutionality is the spacious and ambiguous language of many
clauses in the Constitution that require interpretation and application
in the course of judicial review." 3 The extent to which an exercise of
the Court's power is regarded as suspect, and therefore politically controversial, will be affected significantly by whether that exercise can be
defended as either compelled or reasonably inferrable from the constitutional text and structure as interpreted in light of the framers' intent. Where the Court's actions are perceived as disassociated from the
Constitution, "the Court readily opens itself to the charge.., of being
no more than an added layer of the political process or no different
from a continuing constitutional convention. '36 When this criticism
becomes sufficiently pervasive, the Court's actions may become impossible to justify on the ground that it is merely discovering the law of
the Constitution and carrying out the intentions of the framers.
Although these concerns are associated most often with the Court's interpretation of such constitutional guarantees as due process or equal
protection, they would appear to be as applicable to a determination
of whether and when the exercise of judicial power is valid at all.. Accordingly, for the critics with whom Choper is concerned, the Federalism and Separation Proposals must be shown to be compatible with
the text and framers' intent.
It is here that Choper's theory runs into serious difficulty. His
resort to textual exegesis and historical analysis seems to be offered in
afterthought. It represents a superficial attempt to offer mainstream
theoretical legitimacy to what is otherwise a largely pragmatic and
political view of the Court's proper role. This kind of pragmatisim is
precisely the sort which is likely to create the greatest threat to the
public's perceptions of the integrity and legitimacy of the Court's
33.
34.
35.
36.

P. 267.
Pp. 266-67.
P. 136.
Id.
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judgments." ' In this regard, it is important to recall that much of
Choper's argument for the Federalism and Separation Proposals is
based upon sensitivity to the Court's vulnerability in terms of public
opinion. He argues that public perceptions of the correctness or
fairness of a decision are less likely to affect public reaction than the
Court's "general public image" at the time the case is decided. 3' This
image may well be based upon the public's sense of whether the
Court's overall performance is consistent or even. For many, the questions Choper would have the Court find nonjusticiable will be at least
as appropriate and legitimate for judicial resolution as the individual
rights, federalism, and judicial autonomy" issues which he would permit it to decide, especially given his conclusion that the Court invites
40
special hostility when it acts to protect minority and individual rights.
The fact that Choper's Court would single out just such issues for
review would attract even greater attention, suspicion and hostility
than might otherwise be expected. 4' And where the decision not to
37. The scope and seriousness of this threat will vary according to one's conception of democratic theory and role the Court plays within that theory. If one proceeds
from the view that judicial activism is fully consistent with democracy as properly conceived, concern for the legitimacy of judicial review will be less of an issue. For a
general discussion of this issue, see Bishin, JudicialReview in Democratic Theory, 50
S. CAL. L. REv. 1099 (1977). For different perceptions of the consistency of judicial
review with democratic theory, compare Johnson, In Defense of JudicialActivism, 28
EMORY L.J. 901 (1979) and Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society-JudicialActivism or Restraint, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968), with Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). The problem
for Choper is that his argument for judicial activism, although, to be sure, selective activism, proceeds from the assumption that activism is democratically suspect.
38. P. 156.
39. The notion that the Court should be empowered to protect its own processes
from legislative incursion has been regarded by many scholars as perhaps the least controversial aspect of judicial review. See, e.g., Strong, JudicialReview; A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-ConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 249
(1967); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1,
34-36. Although such power may make good sense in terms of traditional separationof-powers theory, it is at least arguable that the public would consider the Court's
resolution of the constitutionality of legislation which purports to alter its own
jurisdiction to be particularly unfair and unwise, or at least as questionable as trusting
Congress to judge ultimately the scope of its own power.
40. Pp. 131-36.
41. If a public opinion poll were to list all of the Supreme Court cases principally
included in most constitutional law casebooks, along with a description of the constitutional issues presented and the Court's decision, and asked for a ranking of the top
twenty or so in order of their significance, I would not be surprised to see Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976); and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), ranking right up
there with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Moreover, if that
same poll were to ask whether the Supreme Court should have decided the constitu-
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decide certain categories of cases is regarded as highly political and
thus unprincipled, the Court's overall image is likely to suffer.
This criticism may be better understood when placed in the context
of the famous debate between Professors Bickel and Gunther over
Bickel's theory of the "passive virtues"."' Bickel expressed general
agreement with Professor Wechsler's theory of neutral principles"3 but
argued that the absolutism of that theory was "at war with a
democratic system""-that it would have a destabilizing influence
which would lead "the country to ruin by intractable, doctrinaire
stages of irrespressible conflict"." Moreover, Bickel believed that
Wechsler's theory failed to account adequately for the actual
significance of a Court decision which, for lack of a neutral principle,
upheld the challenged legislative decision on grounds that it was "not
tionality of the Vietnam War if it had been raised in a proper case, see, e.g., DaCoste
v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967), my guess is
that, at least during the later stages of the war, a majority of respondents would have
answered affirmatively. Although the "political question" doctrine provided the real
barrier to Supreme Court review, much of the country probably agreed with Justice
Douglas, who habitually dissented from the denial of certiorari. See generally W.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 151-52 (1980). It should be noted that Choper argues
that any decision by the Court on the merits of the Vietnam War would have attracted
more controversy than a refusal to decide. P. 234.
The point here is not that the Court should always decide every constitutional case
or issue presented to it by any party, or that the Court's decision to intervene should be
dictated by public opinion. Instead, I argue only that Choper's reading of public sentiment toward the Court, a reading central to his major proposals, may be open to
serious doubt. If his proposals are no less constitutionally compelled than the current
practice he would reform, this doubt should at least temper our hastiness in accepting
them. This would be especially true for those of us who generally accept his perception
of the Court's role in protecting individual rights.
42. Bickel advanced his theory in a law review article, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961), later reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1938-1962, at 24 (1963). The theory
became an important part of his influential book, A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 111-198 (1962).
43. At the core of this theory was the proposition that the Court must not invalidate .the actions of the other branches of government unless it was able and
prepared to articulate a constitutional principle which rests "with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved," Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesin Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler]-a principle
which (in Bickel's words) would seive as a "rule of action that the Court must be
prepared to apply unrelentingly and without compromise in all future cases to which it
is relevant." A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 120. If the Court could not find such a principle, Wechsler believed that it must uphold the legislature's value choice. Wechsler,
supra note 43, at 19.
44. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 64.
45. Id. For a general discussion of the Wechsler-Bickel dispute, see Deutsch,

Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some IntersectionsBetween Law and
PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968).
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unconstitutional". Such a judgment would not, Bickel feared, be
taken by the public as merely a refusal to invalidate and therefore a
refusal by the Court to intervene in the political process. He warned of
both the "contemporaneous results" and "the portentous aftermaths"
of such determinations, concluding that "[tihe rule that the Court
must legitimate whatever it is not justified in striking down fails to attain its intended purpose of removing the Court from the political
arena; rather, it works an uncertain and uncontrolled change in the
degree of the Court's intervention, and it shifts the direction."'6 Thus
where Wechsler argued that the Court would effectively remove itself
from the realm of politics by refusing to review the legislative judgment, Bickel argued that such action would be taken to indicate the
Court's approval of the legislative judgment. The Court would be
understood as holding that such a judgment was constitutionally
"principled."" 7
In response to this difficulty, Bickel urged the Court to employ the
"passive virtues" in cases for which an appropriately neutral principle
could not be found. This would entail the judicious use of the various
jurisdictional techniques for avoiding decision-techniques of "not
doing"" 8-such as the refusal to grant certiorari and the application of
concepts of justiciability (e.g., standing, ripeness, concreteness).
Although he recognized that no one of these devices could be
employed indiscriminately or at will, he concluded that "one or
another of them will generally be available. . .. ", Finally, and
perhaps most importantly here, Bickel argued that "the techniques and
allied devices for staying the Court's hand, as is avowedly true at least
of certiorari, cannot themselves be principledin the sense in which we
have a right to expect adjudications on the merits to be principled.
They mark the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions
their head and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing paradoxical in finding that here is where the Court is most a political
animal."1°
Professor Gunther's response' to Bickel's theory of the "passive
virtues" went directly to its core assumptions. Gunther noted that
46. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 131.
47. Id. at 70 ("But in actual practice . . . the Court, when it legitimates a
measure, does insert itself with significant consequences into the decisional process as
carried on in the other institutions. This is a necessary consequence of the Court's
power to define and apply society's basic principles").
48. Id. at 112, 169.
49. Id. at 170.
50. Id. at 132 (emphaiss added).

51.

Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Princi-

ple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
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Bickel's perception of the legitimating effects of a Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional challenge on the merits was "open to
question as a description of the political impact" of such a decision
and that it was largely speculative." Although he conceded "some difference in political impact between sustaining a statute on the constitutional merits and staying the Court's hand", the difference was just
not as much as Bickel believed." The gist of Gunther's criticism was
that Bickel's theory was unprincipled. It rested on judgments of expediency with respect to the frequency and occasions of Supreme Court
intervention. Although Bickel believed that his theory would preserve
the Court's power and enhance its integrity, Gunther believed that it
would have precisely the opposite effect. Gunther believed that if the
Court adopted Bickel's theory, it would be forced to act without principle. Instead, it would act-and would be preceived as acting-as a
quintessentially political institution, choosing to decide cases only
where and when it believed its power was needed."'
Professor Gunther's criticism of Bickel's theory of the "passive
virtues" is relevant to analysis of Choper's book. To be sure, Choper
argues that the Court should extricate itself completely from deciding
cases which raise only states' rights and separation of powers issues,
whereas Bickel was advancing a theory of selective and discretionary
non-intervention, but the highly pragmatic justification Choper advances will be taken by many as a recommendation that the Court sacrifice principle for expediency. Judicial review in separation of powers
and federalism issues has been firmly entrenched in our constitutional
jurisprudence." A complete or even selective withdrawal from this
52. Id. at 6-9. Gunther argued that, in essence, it was useless to worry much
about the possibility that the public would regard a refusal by the Court to invalidate a
legislative judgment as a "legitimation" where the Court makes it clear that it is only
"staying its hand." For him, the actual "result of the Court's action... [is] the dominant operative fact." Id. at 7.

53. Id. at 9.
54. Bickel's "virtues" are "passive" in name and appearance only: a virulent
variety of free-wheeling interventionism is at the core of his devices of restraint.
And what Bickel says of some solutions based on the premise of an obligation
always to decide is, after all, more aptly applied to his own prescriptions: they
"lead either to a manipulative process, whose inherent, if highminded, lack of

candor raises issues of its own, or to the abandonment of principle and the involvement of the Court in judgments of expediency, as a second-guesser of the
political institutions; or, more commonly, to both."
Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
55. In Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1980), the court held that a one-house legislative veto violated the doctrine of separation of powers. In rejecting the argument that the appellant lacked standing to assert
his consitutional claims because he was actually asserting the rights of the Executive
and Judicial branches, the court stated: "This argument, however, simply proves too
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position, even if undertaken for the laudable purpose of preserving
and maximizing the Court's effectiveness in other important areas,
might be questioned by a public which, according to Choper, has a
limited tolerance or reverence for the Court in the first place.
A related problem with Choper's theory deserves mention. It is less
concerned with the potential for hostility against the Court than with
an even more basic notion of political reality. The Court might do
itself a profound disservice if it announced its complete impotence in
broad categories of constitutional cases. In this regard, Professor Martin Shapiro observed that the Supreme Court was a political agency
with certain unique characteristics which made it especially suited to
protect a special clientele.' 6 That clientele consisted of those groups
and individuals with "interests which would otherwise be
unrepresented"" in the other political institutions-the same
minorities and marginal groups which Choper believes the Court has
the unique competence and duty to protect. Shapiro was concerned
that the Court would waste its institutional capital if it intervened on
behalf of those groups which had sufficient access and influence to
protect their interests in the political processes. He was especially concerned, however, about the consequences to the Court if it refused to
respond to the claims of its special clientele because of a generalized
fear of its political vulnerability vis-a-vis the "more democratic" institutions. In this context, he concluded:
Thus the modest opinion, with its praise of the value to be protected and
its disavowal of the Court's ability to do the job, is politically suicidal.
The suicide is largely by means of a self-fulfilling prophecy. For the
more the Court announces its impotence . . . the more impotent it
becomes.... Thus modest opinions of lack of judicial power ignore the
real world in which political power comes to those who seek and construct it."
ing a separation of powers argument. Our constitutional history, however, is
contrary." Id. at 418. The court also rejected the argument that the political question
doctrine made the case nonjusticiable, noting that separation of powers issues are not
"textually committed to any one branch" and that "[lIt would stand the political
question doctrine on its head to require the Judiciary to defer to another branch's
determination that its acts do not violate the separation of powers principle." Id. at
419.
56. M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 34-39 (1966). See also M. SHAPIRO, LAW
AND POLrICS INTHE SUPREME COURT (1964).
57. M. SHAPIRO. FREEDOM OF SPEECH 35 (1966).

58. Id. at 39. See also id._ CIf the Court is to make is maximum contribution to the governing process, it should probably devote its major energies to those
groups which have little other access to government. It need not act as the last resort of
forum shoppers who have been defeated elsewhere").
Where Choper argues that the Court can best'preserve its institutional capital by
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/13
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Those words of caution should be kept in mind in assessing
Choper's arguments for judicial abstinence in broad categories of constitutional issues. Given Choper's views concerning the Court's
generally frail and vulnerable political position, the wholesale
withdrawal contemplated by the Federalism and Separation Proposals
may be taken as an admission of at least its own suspicion regarding
the legitimacy of its power. And although "there is something to the
argument that the Court must profess some limitations for fear that intervening always and everywhere will result in a dribbling away of its
power,"" it is equally true that "[tihe Justice who retreats in case after
case, husbanding his strength for the really big one, may find60 when the
time comes that he has retreated right off the battlefield."
Professor Choper recognizes this problem and attempts to respond
to it. He notes the objection that the Federalism Proposal would
ultimately jeopardize "national unity" as well as the Court's prestige
because the public has come to regard the Court's approval or disapproval of political judgments as essential to their dignity and
legitimacy. 6' He claims that this argument may be overstated and, in
any event, that the Court's validation of national power has attracted
to it the public hostility that would otherwise have been directed at
Congress. Moreover, in addressing what he calls the "popular
' ' 62 Choper responds to the
misconception respecting nonjusticiability,
claim that the Court's categorical refusal to review whole classes of
cases might be misconstrued by the public as approval of the challenged government action, much in the same way that some have claimed
63
that a selective denial of certiorari might be misconstrued. He argues
that the public will be able to make a clear distinction between the
two-that a wholesale refusal to decide all such cases will be perceived
as less of a legitimation than a more discriminatory policy of certiorari
denials. I am not so sure that his reading of the likely public response
is accurate, but he does concede that there may be a "no wholly confident answer" to this issue. 64 It may be that this analysis, however,
misses a more important point: What effect will the Court's public
refusing to respond to the federalism issues raised by the states and the separation-ofpowers issues raised by Congress and the President, Shapiro argued that this goal
could be achieved by refusing to entertain the claims of groups who were seeking to
vindicate economic, national security or general welfare interests.
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id.
61. Pp. 299-33.
62. Pp. 233-35.
63. See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra. See also Hart & Wechsler,
supra note 29, at 1613-16.
64. P. 234.
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acknowledgement of its incompetence or impotence for nonjusticiable
issues have on its overall image and authority? If the adverse effect is
as substantial as I have suggested, the broad impact of the Federalism
and Separation Proposals may be much more destructive to the
Court's overall institutional position than would the more selective
refusals to intervene manifested by such devices as the political ques6
tion doctrine. 1

B.
Choper's theory raises further problems. First, the Federalism and
Separation Proposals suggest a general view of the Constitution and
the Court which, if incorporated into constitutional theory, might
65. Choper's Federalism Proposal is grounded in the view that the states qua
states can protect their interests adequately in Congress through the influence of their
senators and representatives as well as other lobbying efforts. The supposed existence
of such political safeguards has long had an important influence on the development
of notions of federalism, see, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316 (1819). Professor Choper's focus on these
political safeguards is perhaps the most comprehensive and direct since Professor
Wechsler's influential article seventeen years ago. Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). Choper, however, takes the notion of
political safeguards beyond Wechsler's conception. Wechsler noted that "the national
political process in the United States-and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to
retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states." Id.
at 558. Observing that "the Framers" (e.g. Madison) "did not emphasize the function
of the Court" in resolving federalism issues, id., Wechsler argued that "the Court is
on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of
Congress in the interests of the states. . . ." Id. at 559. But where Choper relies upon
these factors to support his argument for complete withdrawal of judicial review from
federalism issues, Wechsler wrote: "This is not to say that the Court can decline to
measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called upon to face the
question in the course of ordinary litigation; the supremacy clause governs there as
well." Id.
Although the political safeguards analysis invoked by Wechsler and Choper is not
without its problems, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241-42
(1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE], there may be good reasons for the Court to
refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Congress where there are strong
reasons to believe that the states' interests have been adequately represented. Id. at
241. See also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856-80 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). And if the Court's refusal to decide such issues enhances its effectiveness in individual rights cases, so much the better. But as Professor Tribe has
noted, "if state institutional interests prove to be inadequately represented in Congress, then the Supreme Court's contemporary commerce clause doctrine would have
to be considered deficient to the extent it leaves state autonomy unprotected." L.
TRIBE, supra note 65, at 241. Accordingly, Professor Choper's goals might be better
served by developing a theory which would suggest standards for determining when
and where the political safeguards are most likely to be effective in protecting the
states' interests.
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seriously erode the Court's ability to protect individual and minority
rights. Both proposals are premised on the view that the relevant institutions have sufficient incentive and power to protect their constitutional prerogatives as they see them. Choper does not take the view
that the Constitution provides no standards for the resolution of such
disputes, nor does he argue that it is unreasonable to suppose that
there are "right answers" to the questions they raise." In this sense,
although he maintains that reconciliation of federal-state and Congress-President disagreements will, by their nature, be more pragmatic
than principled, he does not suggest that the Constitution itself, in
terms of its text, history, and structure provides no clear standard or
guidance for their resolution. Instead, he argues that "if the
[federalism] question is a close one, as virtually all real world ones are,
then, irrespective of its 'correct' answer, the political branches should
67
be trusted to produce a reasonable and fair judgment." Additionally,
he argues that where a convenient and amicable resolution cannot be
worked out between the disputing institutions, it would be futile for
the Court to attempt to resolve the controversy.6 Even if the Court
did intervene, it would inevitably subject itself to hostile criticism
which would diminish its overall political capital.
For several reasons, I believe these arguments suggest a conception
of the Constitution which may be inconsistent with that which
underlies the Individual Rights Proposals. Further, the adoption of the
Federalism and Separation Proposals might undermine the Court's
ability to protect individual rights.
In a recent article, 69 Professor Richard Parker described two conceptions of a constitution-'"two polar pictures of our constitutional
7
order that have appeared from time to time." " Parker first portrays a
constitution "inhering in the constitutional document or in a system of
abstract doctrine of constitutional law" which "is seen as transcending-disembodied from-the clash of wills and movement of passions
66. The book provides no indication that Choper would endorse the "right
answer thesis" advanced by Professor Dworkin. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter cited as R. DWORKIN]. See also Dworkin, No Right

Answer? 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1978). Choper assumes, however, that the Constitution
does provide a standard for resolving power disputes between governmental branches
and that it is sensible to talk of an abstractly correct resolution in such cases instead of
assuming that whoever wins the interbranch battle is theoretically entitled to win. See,
e.g., pp. 175-76, 202.
67. P. 222.
68. Pp. 222, 305.
69. Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Parker].

70.

Id. at 224.
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that characterize day to day political life." ' 7' This disembodied constitution is "enforced on political life to discipline those wills and passions" and its "enforcement is necessarily a process totally divorced
from politics-detached, objective, a matter of abstract legal
'reason.'"72 Contrasted with this conception is a quite different
constitutional notion:
At the other extreme, our constitutional order may be depicted as inhering not in a document or doctrine, but in our day to day politics. In
that case, it is seen not as transcending the political process, but as embodied in it. The political process, in turn, is seen not as threatening, but
as operating spontaneously in "good order." We can count on our
political system, once set up, to work well enough. Hence, constitutional
order need not be enforced on politics. It need hardly be enforced at all.73
According to Parker, those who have viewed the Constitution as
embodied in the political order have been generally sanguine about the
political process, viewing it as basically rational and unthreatening.
Such an order would rarely, if ever, require the helping hand of
judicial intervention. 7 ' In any event, an embodied constitution would
less likely be understood as containing specific, concrete or objectively
discoverable norms or values.
The Federalism and Separation Proposals comport with such an
embodied constitution. They are dependent on the view that relations
between the President and the Congress will be generally well ordered
and rational, and that the states will be able to work effectively and,
for the most part, harmoniously with Congress in pursuit of common
goals. Moreover, they incorporate the idea that constitutional standards pertaining to the appropriate and relevant power balances are
"spacious," "ambiguous," "broad" or "indeterminate," thus making suspect any judicial attempts to settle disputes."
By contrast, the Individual Rights Proposal comports with the no71. Id. at 225.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. If the constitution's allocations of power were clear and objectively discernible, there would be no reason to expect substantial hostility or belligerance when the
Court interpreted and enforced them. In any event, there would be no need for special
concern about or deference to such adverse public reaction. pp. 136-38.
75. As previously discussed, Choper relies upon the view that his proposals are
not "at war with original intent" (p. xviii) and does not claim that his proposals are affirmatively mandated or suggested by the constitutional text. Indeed, it is not clear that
he relies upon even the most conceptualized notions of original intent. See Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). Instead, he proceeds from both "empirical"and political conclusions drawn from his
own perceptions of how the Court has functioned in the past as well as arguments and
studies made by other scholars.
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tion of a disembodied constitution-a constitution which exists apart
from the political process. It contemplates the existence of constitutional values which, although often flexible and loosely defined, transcend the political order and govern its arrangements. Moreover, this
proposal acknowledges that the political order will often fail to work
in a rational and coherent manner. It accords an active role to the
Supreme Court because the Court is insulated from the pressures and
passions of day to day political life in a way which allows it to be both
reflective and objective in determining constitutional values. Choper's
rejection of the embodied constitutional conception as it relates to individual rights is especially evident in his apparent dissatisfaction with
a strictly process-oriented perspective which would limit the Court's
and remitting all
power to "keeping the political passages unblocked
76
democracy."1
of
trusteeship
the
to
further matters
Choper's problem is that he may not be able to have the Constitution both ways. His theory's assumption that the Constitution should
be considered embodied for some issues and disembodied for others
may prove too much. Of course, it might be argued that the Constitution itself, in view of its text, history and structure consists of two
quite distinct parts, the embodied part dealing with questions of institutional design and mechanics and the disembodied part dealing
with questions of individual rights. But Choper does not make this
argument, or at least he does not rely upon it. Indeed, the Judicial
Proposal reflects a disembodied constitutional conception with respect
to important structural issues. Even if we were willing to overlook this
problem and accept the theoretical possibility of both constitutional
conceptions operating side by side,"' practical obstacles to their
peaceful coexistence will clearly arise. Given the fundamentally different conceptions of the Constitution upon which they rely, each will
exert continuing pressure on the other in a way which is likely to
diminish their justificational power.
This point may be clarified by considering the following questions.
Will the public, whose perceptions and acceptance of the Court are so
vital to Choper's whole theory, after being told that the Constitution is
merely hortatory"" in cases involving states' rights and separation of
76. P. 78.
77. Professor Parker notes the attempts by some theorists to establish the
theoretical underpinnings for the coexistence of both the embodied and disembodied
conceptions through the employment of "analytic" and "synthetic" strategies.
Parker, supra note 69, at 225. He concludes that such attempts have been generally unsuccessful.
78. See .. Choper supra note 8, at 305. It should be noted that at least in the
terms of Separations Proposal, Choper denies that his theory would render the Constitution hortatory. P. 305.
Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2

powers, be unpersuaded when the Court announces that the same Constitution is definitive and binding concerning individual rights? Given
the alleged suspicion which any exercise of judicial review attracts,
along with the open-endedness of most constitutional provisions concerning individual rights and the lack of devices which would provide
meaningful public control on the Court's power," wouldn't the public
perceive such distinctions as sophistic? And is it not likely that people
with political power and the means and incentive to exercise such
power (e.g., non-discrete and non-insular majorities) would prefer to
rely upon the political processes rather than the Court to measure that
power against claims of its abuse? If most people believe that they do
not need the Court to get by reasonably well in this world, will the
Court's reaffirmation of that view in some cases preclude it from effectively disaffirming it in others? Finally, is it not likely that the
political attractiveness of an embodied constitution will make it victorious in its battles with the competing, disembodied conception? If
the answer to any of these questions is affirmative, Choper's belief
that the Federalism and Separation Proposals will enhance the Court's
power to deal effectively with claims of individuals rights may be
seriously misguided. 0
Significantly, Choper's work appears to have been influenced importantly by the preoccupation with the legitimacy of judicial review
which has characterized the work of Professor Ely. Both argue that
issues which have been regarded previously as implicating major
substantive constitutional principles should be placed outside the ambit
of judicial inquiry. Choper's major proposals are premised in the same
respresentational-reinforcing notion which lies at the core of Ely's
work. 8' And although his goal is to preserve and enhance the Court's
79.

Pp. 49-55.

80. Even if Choper can respond adequately to these concerns pertaining to public
perceptions of the Court, one further question would remain: Would a Court, sufficiently persuaded with its institutional frailty and vulnerability so as to adopt the
Separation and Federalism Proposals, be likely to take seriously the textually inexplicit
and highly pragmatic responsibility to intervene aggressively into the political processes on behalf of individual rights, federal prerogatives vis-a-vis the states, or even its
own institutional prerogatives? Consider, in this regard, Professor Ely's criticism of
the Court's recent procedural due process doctrine, which he believes reflects an unwarranted modesty caused by the Court's proper withdrawal from the doctrine of
substantive due process and its recently manifested reentry into that field: "But once
'due process' is reinvested with serious substantive content, things get pretty scary and
judges will naturally begin to look for ways to narrow the scope of their authority. The
reaction is one that might have suggested that the error was in resurrecting substantive
due process, but instead it seems to have meant that due process, properly so called,
has been constricted." J. ELY, supra note 5, at 20.
81. See J. ELY, supra note 5, at 75, 87-104.
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ability to define and protect values from which substantive individual
rights derive, 82 the defensive position from which he proceeds may be
harder to abandon selectively than he believes. A Court which fancies
itself primarily as a plumber whose special responsibility lies in
unclogging political process only where political actors cannot work
harmoniously and efficiently may become reluctant or unable to interpose itself against those processes' ultimate value choices. But more
importantly, the notion of an embodied constitution which informs
much of Choper's theory may be so attractive in political or prudential
terms that it will undermine the Constitution's capacity to serve as a
substantive foundation for the determination of individual rights.
As noted previously, Choper's book is concerned primarily with
articulating and defending a functional justification for judicial
review. The next section of this essay will focus on problems associated
with his argument.
III.

At the core of Professor Choper's theory is the notion that the
Court is the institution of our government which is best suited, by virtue of its "undemocratic structure" and its location apart from the
"dynamics of the American political process," 8 3 to protect minority
and individual rights. Active judicial supervision of public policymaking which threatens the interests of individuals is justified because the
Court is the "governing body that is insulated from political responsibility and unbeholden to self-absorbed and excited majoritarianism,"
thus permitting it an "objectivity that elected representatives are
not-and should not be-as capable of achieving."

84

By analogy to the

human body, each organ should perform the function to which it is
best suited. The Court might be viewed as the kidneys of our system,
cleansing the life-blood of the body politic of unwanted and ultimately
corrupting impurities.
Choper's harnessing of the functional justification argument in
support of a theory of judicial review is one of the most ambitious and
sophisticated effort of its kind. The underlying notion, however, is a
82.

Although Choper concedes that "from the perspective of traditional

democratic theory, there is much to be said" for a theory of judicial review which
"limits the Court's role to keeping normal political channels unclogged and affording
all participants in the democratic process a full and fair opportunity to influence the
promulgation and alteration of policies affecting them," he goes on to conclude that
"because the scheme of our political democracy is qualified so as to preserve other
libertarian values and the machinery of the political process is untrustworthy in sustaining them, the Court has rightfully gone beyond these bare minimums." Pp. 71-72.
83. P. 64.
84. P. 68.
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familiar feature in contemporary constitutional scholarship. As
previously noted, Professor Martin Shapiro saw the Court as a
political agency which should and does exercise political power on
behalf of a special and limited constituency; 85 for him, a true
understanding of the Court's role could be achieved only "by correlating various powers and functions in specific areas, rather than by
a general examination of the nature of the Court."6 Professor Bickel
wrote of the court's special "capacities for dealing with matters of
principle that legislatures and executives do not possess"; he believed
that "judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursing the ends of
government""" and that the courts are "a great and highly effective
education institution. "88
The view that the Court is uniquely able to perform an educative
function has been central in many attempts to defend for it an active
role in the protection of individual rights. 89 Especially common in the
discussions of those who have argued for an active judicial role has
been the notion that the Court possesses special characteristics which
allow it to measure the short term or transient conceptions of our
society's ideals or values, as reflected in past and current public policy,
against the long-term and enduring values manifested in the Constitution. A classical expression of this conception was offered by Professor
Henry Hart, who wrote that the Court was "predestined in the long
run, not only by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also
by the hard facts of its position in the structure of American institutions, to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and
durable principles ..
"90 Recently, Professor Ely has relied, in part,
85. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
86. M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1964).
87. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 25-26.
88. Id. at 26.
89. See, e.g., Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
1099, 1136 (1977); Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 561, 578
(1954); Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 716 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Perry). Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1963).
90. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 99
(1959). See also, Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1316 (1976) ("In my view, judicial action only achieves such legitimacy by
responding to, indeed by stirring, the deep and durable demand for justice in our
society."); Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9 (1979) ("The
task of the judge is to give meaning to constitutional values ... by working with the
constitutional text, history, and social ideals. He searches for what is true, right, or
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upon the special institutional characteristics and perspective of federal
judges in arguing that they are uniquely situated to ensure the smooth
and harmonious operation of the political processes. 9'
The functional justification argument for active judicial protection
of individual and group rights accurately identifies the role that the
Court has played and should play in our constitutional scheme.9" I do
not believe, however, that Choper has developed a sufficiently deep explanation or justification for such a role, particularly in light of his extensive treatment and concern for the antimajoritarian and (for him)
antidemocratic" nature of judicial review. In this regard, it is worth
noting Choper's concession that the Court is not the only institution
with either the capacity or the proven ability to recognize and protect
minority rights. 94 Given the general commitment to majoritarian accountability which characterizes our political system and the majority's
general ability to recognize and account for the claims of individual
and minority groups, Choper's argument that the Court should actively intercede into the political process in response to these claims
because it is "the most effective guarantor of the interests of the unpopular and unrepresented" 9 seems incomplete. Indeed, were the
Court to respond affirmatively to all or most claims of majoritarian
just."); Perry, supra note 89, at 716, 731 (the Court "must function as the institutional
agency of anti-majoritarian forces", correcting the "occasional myopia" and
moderating the "occasional excesses" of the political processes); Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973) ("The Court's task is to ascertain the weight of the principle
in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law.")
91. J. ELY, supra note 5, at 102-04. It should be noted that, while Choper and Ely
emphasize similar institutional qualities which justify a special role for the Court, their
conception of the appropriate scope of judicial review appears to be quite different.
Compare id. with J. CHOPER, supra note 8, at 78.
92. In a forthcoming book, Professor Michael Perry constructs a powerful argument that much of the Court's constitutional doctrine cannot be defended as legitimate
in terms of constitutional text and history. Equally compelling is his argument that the
*legitimacy of much contemporary constitutional doctrine protective of human rights
depends upon the persuasiveness of attempts to develop justifications derived from the
unique function that judicial review performs in our political system. M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1980) (forthcoming, Yale
University Press) [hereinafter cited as M. PERRY].

93. Choper concludes that "irrespective of the content of its decisions, the process of judicial review is not democratic because the Court is not a politically responsible institution." P. 10 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 8 ("American history has shown, certainly at the national level and
generally at the state and local levels as well, that with relatively few exceptions-usually regarding peculiarly identifiable, despised, and defenseless rouns-the
political process has not tyrannized minorities").
oi. P. 69.
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abuse-where persuasive reasons existed that the political process
themselves could offer prompt and meaningful redress 96 -the cost to
the Court's limited institutional capital could be as great as that
which Choper attaches to intervention in states' rights and separationof-power cases. 97
Given these observations, what is needed is further development of
arguments which would provide a deeper, functional justification for
the exercise of the Supreme Court's power in defense of individual
rights. 98 Although this is not the place for a detailed elaboration of
such arguments, some suggestions include: (1) an articulation of the
occasions in which it is most likely that the political processes will be
inherently incapable of recognizing and responding to the assertion of
claims of individuals and minorities, and the reasons for such incapacity; 99 (2) arguments supporting the legitimacy of the claims allegedly ig96. Professor Ely has argued that majoritarian abuses of individual and
minorities' rights can always be understood in terms of the blockage or malfunctioning
of the normal political processes. His theory of judicial review is based upon the notion that the Court's primary and most legitimate function is to police those processes
to assure their openness to the claims of all individuals and groups. J. ELY, supra note
5. Although the normal political processes may sometimes accord proper regard and
protection to individual and minority rights, Ely believes-mistakenly, in my
view-that they always will. See Saphire, The Searchfor Legitimacy in Constitutional
Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Saphire].
97. Choper does not expressly argue that the Court should review every case in
which violation of constitutional rights is asserted. Indeed, inherent limitations on
judicial resources would make such an argument unrealistic. However, aside from
noting that "the smaller the allegedly aggrieved group and the more intense the felt
need or the contempt of the majority, the greater the necessity of judicial review for
the preservation of personal liberty," p. 69, and acknowledging the problems inherent
in the work of other scholars, id. at 72-79, Choper does not advance any guidelines
which he would apply to limit the timing or scope of judicial review.
It should be noted that Choper does believe that the Court's role, even in service of
individual rights, is a limited one. He concludes that the Court's "constitutional role is
limited to protecting those individual rights that are unambigously expressed or that at
least may in some persuasive way fairly be found within the broad philosophical confines of the basic charter." Id. at 123. Given the general agreement that the Constitution is seldom unambiguous in the expression of rights it purports to confer, see, e.g.,
A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 35-46; but see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
(1977), and the open-endedness of the alternative standard, Choper's perceptions of
limitations may not provide meaningful guidelines.
98. For a richer and deeper approach to the functional justification theory than
that offered by Choper, see M. PERRY, supra note 92, at Chapter 4.
99. In support of his Individual Rights Proposal, Choper does refer to the notion
that one can expect greater objectivity from the Court than from elected representatives as well as to the associated idea that the Court is more likely to engage in
"dispassionate decisionmaking." P. 68. He also alludes to "the people's frequent collective insensitivity (and that of their electorally responsible representatives) to constitutionally prescribed freedoms that were believed would be endangered by majoritarian institutions . . . ." P. 80. But his subsequent survey of the record of judicial
review in individual right cases, while focusing on many decisions of the Court which
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nored or rejected in terms of values explicitly or implicitly recognized
in the Constitution or otherwise appropriate to constitutional adjudication; (3) arguments in support of the notion that the Court is immune from the deficiencies which render the political processes unable
to respond to the claims in question because of its peculiar
characteristics including its politically insular position,100 the personality of its members, and the dynamics of its internal processes.
Moveover, it might be desirable to provide greater historical support
for such a judicial role, in terms of the framers' intent or the
understandings of those involved in the ratification process, although
recognized more expansive conceptions of individual rights than those reflected in the
government action under attack, does not uncover or construct any rationale supporting the view that the political processes were inherently incapable of according protection to individual rights involved. Pp. 80-122. In my view, a theory which persuasively
argued that the political processes are inherently incapable of adhering to and preserving certain constitutional values (at least in some situations) would provide sounder
justification for the Court's special role in protecting individual rights than would a
theory premised on either occasional or random legislative failures.
100. This appears to be the primary argument upon which Choper relies. Pp.
68-69. Although the political isolation of the Supreme Court is certainly an important
element in the equation, Choper is not very specific in explaining why it is sufficient to
justify the Court's role. Interestingly, he argues that the political isolation enjoyed by
judges of the inferior federal courts is less complete than that of Supreme Court
Justices. Accordingly, they "cannot be relied upon as confidently" to protect individual rights. Pp. 69-70.
This last point injects an important ambiguity into Choper's theory. If one concedes
all of his major arguments and accepts their implication for the Court's proper role,
what conclusion should be reached with respect to the role of the inferior federal
courts? Are they to remain free to decide states' rights and separation-of-powers cases
without the prospect of Supreme Court review? The difficulties inherent in such a
system are self-evident. Similarly, what role is left to the state courts in resolving these
issues? Are they to refuse to decide states' rights issues, and may they do so free of
Supreme Court review?
These questions reveal a deeper ambiguity inherent in Choper's work. If the
Federalism and Separation Proposals are responsive to prudential concerns unique to
the Supreme Court, should they apply with equal force to the state courts for whom
they may be either less relevant or inopposite? See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Co., 49
U.S.L.W. 4111, 4117 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). If they are exclusively prudential,
they arguably would be inapplicable in state court adjudication, thus permitting state
courts to decide the proper scope of federal power free from Supreme Court review. If
they are constitutionally compelled, thus subsumed into constitutional doctrine, they
would operate fully on state courts. This dilemma is analogous to the Article III
justiciability problem, where the distinction between prudential and constitutional
limits on federal judicial power, while extraordinarily important, is often extremely
murky. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
In my view, Choper does not adequately clarify his position on this issue. For example, although he argues that the Federalism Proposal is not inconsistent with the
framers' intent, he does not expressly argue that it is constitutionally compelled. P.
241-43. Moreover, although he implies that his thesis is a "constitutional" one, id. at
241, his resort to the notion of justiciability in connection with the various proposals
he advances only exacerbates this confusion.
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the existence of such support should not be crucial. Evidence of an
ongoing practice of judicial protection of individual rights explainable
in terms of a "political theory which justifies the constitution as a
whole ' "' would provide strong support for the Court's role. In the
words of Professor Fiss, the legitimacy of the practice of an institution
"depends on the capacity of the institution to perform a function
within the political system and its willingness to respect the limitations
02
on that function.'
For many, the attempt to justify judicial activism in the protection
of individual rights in functional terms may prove too political or
pragmatic. Recognition of the practical contribution that the Supreme
Court has made to the relative success and stability of our constitutional system, however, has been at least implicit in the work of most
theorists, regardless" of their differing conclusions concerning the optimum level of the Court's involvement.103 Professor Choper has
argued forthrightly in support of this approach, and has provided us
with a thoughtful and provocative defense. While he may have
overstated the fragility of the Court's institutional position as well as
the steps it should take to enhance the effectiveness of its main work,
his book should serve as a powerful reminder that the Court must be
sensitive to its central role in the development and protection of individual rights. Excessive deference to the other institutions of government in the formulation and preservation of individual rights may
serve to undermine the Court's ability to accomplish its most important function.
IV.
In a recent article tracing the increasing acceptance of judicial
review in Europe,'10 Professor Mauro Cappelletti, observed, with what
101. R. DwoILKIN, supra note 66, at 106.
102. Fiss, Forword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979). For an
approach to the appropriate role of historical argument which comports with the view
suggested in the text, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 226 (1980).
103. Raoul Berger, perhaps the purist textualist or intentionalist constitutional
scholar writing today, has tacitly recognized the reality, if not the acceptability, of the
Court's functional role, and how deeply imbedded that role has been in our
jurisprudence. Although he argued that the Court's interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment have been largely unjustified, he wrote: "It would, however, be utterly
unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in the face of expectations that
the segregation decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry-expectations confirmed by every decent instinct. That is more than the courts should undertake and more, I believe, than the American people would desire." R. BERGER, supra,
note 7, at 412-13.
104. Capalletti, The "'MightyProblem" of JudicialReview and the Contribution
of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.409 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Capalletti].
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one takes to be amazement: "Despite using their Bill of Rights to
restrain governmental action in perhaps a model way for much of the
world, the Americans are still struggling with their lasting doubts over
the legitimacy of their own legacy! '"" ° Professor Choper's book
represents an important contribution to that genre of constitutional
scholarship which seeks to assuage these doubts.10 6 Although Choper's
theory raises as many questions as it answers, the impressive quality
and careful elucidation of his reasoning, as well as the high professional esteem which he brings to his work, provides important support
for a meaningfully active judicial role in the development and protection of individual rights.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Choper's book relates to
his decision not to deal with the substance of constitutional doctrine.
While arguing for the duty to use judicial power on behalf of individual rights, and the legitimacy of such a -use, the book "in no way
0
undertakes to say how this superintendence should be carried out."°'
Questions of how the Court should decide claims of individual rights
and what rights the Constitution guarantees are left wholly unexplored.' This is not to say that the book fails to provide insight into
Choper's thinking on substantive issues; his discussion of the record of
judicial review' °1 reveals a clear egalitarian perspective." 0 One who
searches for the author's conception of the nature, form, and scope of
individual rights, however, will be disappointed.
Choper's failure to address substantive issues is symptomatic of
105. Id. at 429 n.77. Although he expresses skepticism "about the possibility of
drawing an abstract line to determine how far judicial review can legitimately go," id.
at 410 (footnote omitted), Capalletti is quite clear in his endorsement of the concept of
judicial activism. Id. at 410-11 n.7.
106. The debate over legitimacy may be an inevitable feature of our constitutional
landscape. As I have written elsewhere, the search for legitimacy may have a constructive, although limited, contribution in terms of the proper content of constitutional
doctrine. Saphire, note 96 supra; Saphire, Book Review, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1475 (1980).
107. P. 79
108. P. 1.
109. Pp. 79-122.
110. Although Choper has offered substantive criticism and theory in his prior
writings, see, e.g., Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard,47 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1963.); Choper, The EstablishmentClause and Aid to
ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260 (1968); CHOPER, KAMiSAR & TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1978-79 (1979), he has told me that he
does indeed view the substantive issues as "generally complicated and profound," P.
1, and that he is not yet prepared to offer a fully developed and integrated
methodological framework for constitutional decisionmaking. Perhaps his reluctance
to offer an incomplete theory of rights suggests how deserving he is of the general
esteem in which he is held by the profession.
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what I believe is a growing reluctance by scholars to address questions
about values in constitutional law. The value-skepticism of theories
proposed by scholars such as John Ely"' has put many value-oriented
scholars on the defensive." 2 There is a growing sense that questions of
morality can properly be discussed solely in terms of metaphysics and
theology, not in the language of constitutional argument and
doctrine.'1 3 According to this view, morality may have relevance for
the creation of public policy but not for its judicial evaluation. The
debate over the proper judicial role can be understood as taking place
in a relatively safe haven, free from many of risks which would certainly be associated with a debate over values.I" To a large extent, traditional theory, beginning with Justice Marshall's justification for
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, I"Ipresumes some judicial involvement in the enforcement of constitutional rights. The proper
scope of this involvement clearly should be influenced by questions of
institutional functions, structures and relationships. But perhaps more
fundamentally, it should be equally influenced by our perception of
the scope and meaning of the values themselves." 6 If one takes a strictly positivist view of the Constitution-a view which separates law from
morality-the judicial task could be easily defined and its performance
evaluated."' But if the Constitution is understood as embodying a
"fusion of constitutional law and morality," II that task becomes vastly more complex and controversial. Thus a complete theory of judicial
review must depend on something more than the functional analysis
111.

J. ELY, note 5 supra.

112.

See, e.g., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77

MICH. L. REv. 981, 1034-38 (1979). But see, e.g., Cappelletti, supra note 104, at 410-11
n.7; Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703 (1980).
113. See generally Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1229.
114. Much of the current debate in constitutional theory is about whether values
exist at all and whether they are judicially discoverable or enforceable. It is not a
debate over values-that is what values are constitutionally manifested and how they
may be translatable into substantive rights.
115. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).

116. For example, if constitutional values are perceived as specific or concrete, an
active judicial role in their identification and enforcement would be consistent with the
sort of interpretivism which is uncontroversially legitimate. See generally Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975). This would also be the
case if they were perceived as susceptible to an historical determination which could be
regarded as dispositive. In either case, the special characteristics of courts vis-a-vis
other political institutions would have less relevance to the question of judicial role
than Choper's theory requires.

117. For a description and criticism of such a conception of constitutional law, see
R. DwoRKIN, supra note 66, at 131-49.
118. Id. at 149.
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which Choper offers. It must confront the moral nature and meaning
of the Constitution, not avoid it. It must offer a basis for resolving the
moral issues inherent in constitutionalism.
It is in this sense that we are at an important crossroad in constitutional law, to which I referred at the beginning of this essay. Choper's
book underscores the importance of moral theory to a constitutional
regime which contemplates an active judicial role in the service of individual rights. Judicial activism may not be wholly defensible in purely functional terms. Although Choper appears to disagree with the
modest nature of Professor Ely's theory of judicial review, I' his book
does not offer a basis for rejecting it. For those who share Choper's
broad vision of individual rights, that is the work which lies ahead.
119.

J. ELY, note 5 supra.
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